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This article analyzes power dynamics in Vieques, Puerto Rico, in the immediate
aftermath of the U.S. Navy’s closure of its live-fire range on the island. A grassroots
movement to halt live bombing exercises on this inhabited island built
unprecedented political unity in Puerto Rico and international solidarity. In May
2003, the Navy withdrew from the island it once heralded as the “crown jewel” of its
operations in the Western Hemisphere.
The essay examines several aspects of Vieques’ continuing struggle in a post-Navy
world. First, it examines residents’ hopes and views of different kinds of
development. Second, it investigates the ramifications of former Navy-occupied land
being classified as “environmentally protected.” Finally, it discusses potential
organizing principles for directing Vieques’ development, looking at the challenges
and potential opportunities facing activists.
Since the Navy’s exit, Vieques’ struggle has become complex and multifaceted.
While the military abandoned its facilities in Vieques, base land is extensively
polluted with unexploded ordnance and military contaminants, and the Navy
controls the cleanup of the land. The large majority of former military territory has
been transferred to the U.S. Department of Fish and Wildlife and declared a national
wildlife refuge, a status with significant implications for cleanup. Land use designation
determines the level of cleanup required of the Navy. Identifying the land for
conservation purposes not only continues to estrange islanders from the majority
of the land, but avoids military responsibility for environmental remediation.
Under federal law, land designated for “conservation use” requires only a superficial
cleanup, since presumably no humans would inhabit it. Grassroots activists argue
that without sufficient cleanup, the military is still very much present on the
island, its toxic legacy threatening community health, impeding the socioeconomic
development of Vieques, and denying a true return of land to civilian use.1
While the status and future of former base land remain highly contested,
significant changes are currently unfolding in the former civilian sector and in
western Vieques, where the municipality stands poised to assume control over 4,000
acres of former base land. The Navy’s departure has removed transportation
restrictions that long crippled the island’s economy. For nearly sixty years, the Navy
imposed a danger zone around the coast of Vieques, and forced passenger and cargo
ferries to shuttle a circuitous 21-mile route across the rough waters of the Vieques
Passage to Fajardo, Puerto Rico. New access to a six-mile short route from Western
Vieques to Ceiba, Puerto Rico, may fundamentally transform the residential and
economic patterns on the island, possibly shifting the transportation hub from the
island capital of Isabel Segunda to western Vieques. In addition, the new
transportation route may not only strengthen social and economic ties between
Vieques and eastern Puerto Rico, but it would also shift Vieques’ pattern of
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Vieques Wildlife Refuge as the new obstacle to local visions of development and
examines some of the problematic theoretical assumptions inherent to the park.
Then I present data from interviews conducted during the summer of 2004, and
interpret them within the context of long-term ethnographic and historical research
on social protest in Vieques (McCaffrey 1998, 1999, 2002). In interviews, residents
revealed attitudes toward the future that were marked with considerable
ambivalence. “Agregado consciousness,” however, continues to inform local ideology
and constitutes an important component of the cultural nationalist argument in
favor of the state appropriation of resources against their control by global capital.
Significantly, this cultural nationalist vision not only offers building blocks for
collective action and opposition to privatization, but an egalitarian vision of the
future, in which all residents would be able to access and enjoy resources considered
collective patrimony.
Historical underdevelopment 4

For five hundred years Vieques’ development has been shaped primarily by military
concerns. These interests have kept the island underdeveloped in comparison to
neighboring islands of Puerto Rico, St. Thomas, and St. Croix.5 Competing European
military powers viewed Vieques as a buffer to more profitable and strategically
important colonies and razed rival colonial settlements on the island. For three
hundred and fifty years after indigenous settlements were destroyed, Vieques was
inhabited largely by pirates, smugglers, escaped slaves, and feral cattle. Vieques was
not formally settled and incorporated into Puerto Rico until the mid-nineteenth
century, when a sugar cane industry was established. In the early twentieth century,
under U.S. tutelage, the island remained peripheral.
The outbreak of World War II encouraged U.S. military thinkers to envision Vieques
in strategic terms. Sugar cane land was expropriated in the 1940s as part of a plan to
build a massive naval installation off the coast of eastern Puerto Rico. The devastating
destruction of Pearl Harbor challenged the wisdom of this plan, and base construction
in Vieques was abandoned. During the Cold War, however, the Navy reevaluated
Vieques and expropriated more land to convert the island into a training ground for
amphibious maneuvers, artillery fire, and live bombing exercises. A power struggle
between the Navy, which wanted the entire island of Vieques, and the Puerto Rican
government, which resisted military imposition, created a surreal scenario where a
civilian population of approximately 10,000 American citizens lived in an international
theater of war. For sixty years, conflict brewed in Vieques over the island’s
contradictory position as a civilian residential community and a naval training site.
The U.S. naval presence stunted the island’s socioeconomic development.
The military liquidated the sugar cane industry, consumed the majority of land and
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conceptions of the environment and land use practices are rooted in these older
understandings of land use. These understandings clash with both market-based
efforts to privatize the beach, and conceptions of the environment that are
promoted by the new wildlife refuge.
Fortress Vieques

By understanding the centrality of access to land that informed the struggle with the
Navy, one understands why the U.S. Department of Fish and Wildlife has emerged as
the new lightning rod and locus of residents’ discontent. Fish and Wildlife gained
control of the majority of former base land when the Navy withdrew first from
western Vieques in 2001, and then from eastern Vieques in 2003. In the west, where
the Navy maintained an ammunition depot, Fish and Wildlife controls about half of
formerly military property, an area of 3,100 acres.9 The western area encompasses
coastal lagoons, mangrove wetlands, and beaches where endangered pelicans and sea
turtles nest. While land in the west has not suffered the severe ecological destruction
of constant bombing, the Navy used multiple sites there as dumping grounds for a
variety of hazardous materials. Nearly two million pounds of military and industrial
waste—oil, solvents, lubricants, lead paint, acid, and 55-gallon drums—were disposed
of in different sites in mangroves and sensitive wetland areas. A portion of this waste
contained extremely hazardous chemicals. The extent to which this waste has
leeched into the ground water and coastal water is unknown (Márquez and
Fernández 2000; UMET et al. 2000). In 2005, the Navy was investigating 17
potentially contaminated sites.10
In the east, which was the naval bombing and maneuver area, Fish and Wildlife
has taken control of the entire parcel of 14,573 acres of land, or almost one half of
Vieques Island. The eastern area has been used for naval bombing exercises and
maneuvers since the 1940s. According to the Navy, Vieques was bombed an average
of 180 days per year. In 1998, the last year before protests interrupted maneuvers,
the Navy dropped 23,000 bombs on the island, the majority of which contained
live explosives (U.S. Navy 1999). The focal point of the most intense destruction
was the live impact range, which constitutes 980 acres on the island’s eastern tip,
an area roughly the size of New York City’s Central Park. In 2005, the EPA
formally listed the Vieques bombing range (Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Area)
on the National Priority List of the most hazardous waste sites in the United
States. Yet all 14,000 acres and surrounding waters in eastern Vieques have been
used since the 1940s for a variety of military purposes, such as shooting ranges,
amphibious landing sites, and toxic waste dumps. Coral reefs and sea grass beds
have sustained significant damage from bombing, sedimentation, and chemical
contamination (Márquez and Fernández 2000; Rogers, Cintrón and Goenaga
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Research rationale

One year after the Navy officially shut down its live fire range and withdrew from
Vieques, I interviewed Vieques residents about their understanding of the current
state of the island and their aspirations for the future. What do people in Vieques
want for the future? How do they want to see the island develop? Is there a true
mandate for sustainable development? What are residents’ understandings of
processes currently unfolding? Studies suggest that there is often a significant
disparity between the ideology and formal representation of development projects
and the way development occurs in practice (Crehan and von Oppen 1988;
Leeuwis 2000, Long and Van der Ploeg 1989). “Community” is often conflated with
the interests of a dominant group within a particular context, with the interests of
minority and disadvantaged populations unrepresented (Grant 2001: 978).
I conducted a series of informal and semistructured interviews. One set of
interviews focused on ten community leaders, activists, and government officials
who were actively involved in the development process. These residents included the
mayor, the president of the community planning board, the editor of the oldest local
newspaper, five activists affiliated with the Committee to Rescue and Develop
Vieques (CPRDV), the most influential grassroots organization, and two activists not
formally affiliated with the CPRDV. I was interested in what these leaders’ goals and
aspirations were for Vieques’ future. In order to approach these questions in concrete
terms, I asked questions both about particular project and committee work these
individuals were engaged in, and more general questions about their perceptions of
change and hopes for the future. I sought to use these interviews as a knowledge base
and point of reference to later interviews I planned to conduct within a single barrio.
This second set of interviews, I hoped, would indicate the extent to which the social
movement—its ideology, its goals, its energy—remained active in the citizenry.
The vibrancy of the movement might indicate directions for future organizing
strategies and the shape of future struggles over sustainable development.
At the same time, significant differences in goals, ideology, and perceptions
between leaders and average citizens might point to areas of contestation in
efforts to organize collectively.
Thus, in my second set of interviews, I was interested in how residents not
formally involved in the development process perceived change and how thinking
and planning from the top filtered down. I interviewed residents in nine households
in the working class barrio of Tortuguero.12 Tortuguero is one of Vieques’ most stable
neighborhoods, originally established as a resettlement community after the second
wave of naval expropriations in 1947. The barrio incorporates three streets and
approximately 75 houses. It is bounded by a major road to the north, another planned
neighborhood to the south, a public housing project to the east, and private land to
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of Puerto Rico over there, to improve the highways over there. We got nothing.”
Gabriel quoted a local politician: “Vieques is the cow that gives Puerto Rico milk.”
I found that questions about sustainable development met with blank stares.15
While activists, public officials, and community planners talked extensively about
sustainable development, little of this language seemed meaningful on the grassroots
level. In order to understand residents’ ideas of development and aspirations for the
future, I focused questions on their perceptions of a recently opened resort,
Wyndham Martineau Bay Resort and Spa. After more than ten years of planning and
troubled construction, it was Vieques’ first and only major hotel launched by a San
Juan-based developer and financed by international capital.16
With 150 private sector jobs, Martineau Bay is currently the largest private sector
employer in Vieques. Martineau Bay has widespread support in Vieques on the most
practical level: it fills an immediate, desperate need for local employment. Apparent
support for jobs, however, co-existed with deeper ambivalence about a resort with
gates that exclude and alienate the public, and high walls that effectively (and
illegally) privatize the beach. This ambivalence was expressed in the way that all
interviewed residents who supported the existence of the resort also strongly
rejected the idea of working there.
Damaris Solís Davis, a 37-year-old single mother and an enthusiastic supporter of
Martineau Bay, exemplified these sentiments. Damaris lives in her childhood home
with her mother, a retired GE worker, and her two children, a 17-year-old boy and
14-year-old girl. For the past two years, Damaris has worked part time at a small hotel
owned by a North American resident of Vieques. She works 25 hours a week making
continental breakfasts for guests. Damaris has moved through a variety of jobs over
the past ten years. Previously, she worked as a teacher’s helper at a pre-school,
and as a classroom aide at an elementary school. Damaris felt that Martineau Bay
was great for Vieques, that it had brought a lot of work. I asked her if she would like
to see more resorts like Martineau Bay open in Vieques, “Of course!” she responded
without hesitation, “Because it would generate more employment in Vieques.
There’s still a lot of unemployment in Vieques,” she noted.
In general, Damaris felt that big hotels and the American tourists who frequented
them were the panacea for Vieques’ woes. In twenty years, I asked her, what would
you like to see in Vieques? “American people!” she responded enthusiastically.
“A lot of American people. A lot of tourists. And more hotels.” She preferred to work
for American people, she said. The Puerto Rican guests who came to the hotel she
worked at were cheap and left no tips, she noted. “They have no shame.” In contrast,
American tourists, she felt, were good people: they were “cool and nice” and left
good tips. (The American tourists, she noted were different from the Americans
who lived in Vieques, who were just as stingy as the Puerto Ricans).
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factory work, and employment in a hotel. While he thought that tourism could bring
some benefits to an island like Vieques, Gabriel pointed to Martineau Bay as an
example of what was wrong with that model of development. “It’s a kind of racism,”
he assessed, “If a hotel comes to the island, it should benefit [the owners] and the
citizens who live here. It should not separate the owners from the citizens.”
Lucy Carambot Sánchez, 78 years old, was most vocal in her opposition to large
hotels as a source of economic development. Lucy has lived in Tortugero for over
forty years, for many years running a bar, restaurant and dance club with her husband
out of their home. Her husband recently died of cancer, and her two sons now live in
the United States. Lucy and her family have been active for decades in the struggle to
evict the Navy, and Lucy was quite forthright in her opposition to the resort.
Martineau Bay, in Lucy’s opinion, was the worst-case scenario of what might happen
to Vieques. “We want progress, but not through hotels,” she stressed. Lucy’s
opposition was framed in terms of opposition to privatization of Vieques’ coastline.
“They shouldn’t sell the beaches to anyone. We don’t want it like St. Thomas and St.
Croix here. We don’t want the beaches to go to strangers’ hands. Then they’ll do
what they did with Martineau Bay. This is a hotel for the rich… It’s for millionaires.”
Martineau Bay captures the double bind that working class residents find
themselves in as they yearn for work that will allow them to stay on Vieques while
they oppose development that will impede their access to the land. In Vieques, in
general, there is a high degree of consciousness about privatization of the beaches.
Most residents who opposed Martineau Bay expressed their opposition in terms of
privatization. Informing this consciousness is a form of cultural nationalism that
posits beaches as an essential part of the cultural patrimony of the Puerto Rican
people, as well as a class-based sense of entitlement to the land rooted in older
agrarian relations on the island. These two strands of opposition are apparent in
residents’ discourse surrounding the hotel. Lucy, for example, in declaring her
opposition to Martineau Bay, commented, “We want everyone to enjoy the beach.
Because this beach belongs to us, and the people of Puerto Rico.” Lucy supported
tourism as a source of development for Vieques, but stressed that it needed to be
controlled by the Puerto Rican government, and geared towards less affluent, Puerto
Rican vacationers. “We need to have tourism where the poor can enjoy themselves,”
she argued, “Families need hotels too. [Coastal] resources also need to go to poor
people so that they can enjoy themselves.”
Fifty-three-year-old Felícita Solís Solís voiced similar sentiment about accessibility
as she assessed that Martineau Bay was “too expensive.” Felícita has lived in
Tortugero her whole life and worked for 34 years at General Electric. She is a single
mother and lives with her 21-year-old daughter and a 9-year-old foster daughter in a
two-storey concrete home. Felícita wanted to see small-scale paradores (inns) as the
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control over the land established by the Navy. “Fish and Wildlife has everything in
Vieques,” declared 39-year-old Pito Delarme, a construction worker building a house
in Tortuguero. “Now you can’t collect coconuts and crabs, you can’t fish, you can’t
collect anything!” he exclaimed in exasperation. Pito lives in a rental house in Santa
María, owned by a viequense who resides in St. Croix. Pito lives with his wife and two
small children in a state of insecurity, never knowing if the house will be sold, like so
many others in his neighborhood and throughout the island. Although his father was
a civilian employee of the Navy base, Pito said that he himself had always been active
in the struggle to evict the Navy, participating in picket lines throughout the fouryear movement. Pito was indignant at Fish and Wildlife’s control of former base land,
and highlighted the hypocrisy that he felt underscored the agency’s mandate:
“When the Navy was here, where were these laws? The Navy destroyed the coral,
they killed the turtles, the fish, the crabs, contaminated the land-all of this
destruction and [Fish and Wildlife] never stopped them for 68 years. And now we
want to develop this part of Vieques, and we’re not permitted.”
Pito argued that enforcement of land use restrictions had been intensified under
Fish and Wildlife, while the Navy had been more laissez-faire. Lucy Carambot
emphatically supported this view: “Since the Navy left we have had problems
with Fish and Wildlife. We want liberty, and they are making life impossible for us!
They are worse than the Navy! They won’t let us collect shells off the beach,
we who have been raised here and lived our whole lives here!”
Underlying Lucy’s opposition was a conception of customary land rights that
clashed with Fish and Wildlife’s fortress-like control of the land. “They have gated
off half the world over there!” she exclaimed. “We kicked the Navy out so that we
could be free and have progress. All of our lives we have used the natural resources.
Here there was wood, cattle; here we made charcoal. They are pressuring us.
They don’t want us to do anything! Everyone wants to go the beach and enjoy it.
They are making life miserable.”
Lucy’s vehemence and exasperation pointed to the deep frustration many
residents expressed concerning the turnover of land from the military to Fish and
Wildlife. Fish and Wildlife’s custody of land was an obstacle to the cleanup that
residents wanted. Vieques’ social movement had succeeded in part because it
mobilized concerns about health and high cancer rates. Military contamination
behind the barbed wire fences of the refuge was left unaddressed as long as land
use was designated for endangered birds and turtles, rather than humans.
Thus, wresting land from Fish and Wildlife is part of a broader struggle over
the four goals of development, devolution, demilitarization, and decontamination.
Olga and Luis (pseudonyms), a couple in their sixties, also expressed these ideas.
Olga and Luis are retired from General Electric, where she worked in the factory and
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del bombardeo: en Vieques la lucha continúa” (Peace is more than the end of
bombing: in Vieques, the struggle continues).
Grassroots activists now face the more abstract but equally potent power of the
market and the lumbering bureaucracy of the federal government that stands in the
way of cleanup. The movement now clearly demands continued commitment that is
difficult to muster after five years of constant struggle. Vieques’ grassroots struggle
drew tremendous energy from relatively few people. Vieques as a whole has only a
population of about 10,000, and thus the pool of potential activists is relatively
small. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of activists expressed exhaustion
and pessimism over the struggle that still lies ahead.
Seventy-eight-year-old Severina Guadalupe, a retired school teacher and owner of
a local gas station, was on the front lines of pickets and was arrested in May 2000
when the Navy dismantled civil disobedience encampments on the base. She was
sober in her assessment of the future. “Vieques has been destroyed. Totally
destroyed. We have lost our land. We have lost everything. The Navy committed
irreparable damage. It affects a lot of people mentally. Many people are crazy.
Exhausted. No psychologist can fix this,” she added with an ironic laugh. “I don’t
think Vieques will develop much,” she surmised, “because the land is still occupied.
We have no access to the land. They have kept it. The Navy didn’t give land back.
Fish and Wildlife has it now. Whatever land is not occupied is being bought up.”
Severina expressed bitterness about her fellow citizens, and concern about military
intentions and Puerto Rican politics. “Most people in Vieques have betrayed the
struggle. We’re very divided. My line of thinking is one way and theirs is another.
People have struggled and stopped the maneuvers for now. But [the Navy] will
return. It depends on the party that wins the election. The politicians here are very
underhanded. I don’t have much hope for this town’s future. From the day I was
born, Vieques has been looking to the future for change. Nothing has changed.”
Fifty-eight-year-old Manuel Silva, a life-long independentista who has moved back
and forth between Vieques, St. Croix, and Puerto Rico, described Vieques’ struggle
with the Navy as a “shy victory.” Life without the Navy will be better in Vieques, he
concluded, and already was better in the year since the Navy left. “But not much
better with the governmental system we have in place in Puerto Rico. If we were a
country like Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Chile, or Spain, then our leaders could
make laws that functioned, that were effective. Not only Vieques, but all of Puerto
Rico would be better. Because the government has no power. Not even minimal
power to do things. The things that it does in the interest of the United States are
not power.” Manuel saw that Vieques had several challenges as it faced the future:
“Vieques has two problems. The Navy and all they did, and the occupation of the
land. Each is as important as the other. They not only bombed us and contaminated
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of the Casa del Francés. The success of this strategy was apparent in my interviews
in Tortugero. All residents I interviewed supported the expropriation of the Casa
del Francés. When I pointed out that expropriating the Casa could derail a largescale resort that might bring in hundreds of jobs, they did not waver. The Casa
was universally seen as the patrimony of the Puerto Rican people, belonging in
government hands.18
The CPRDV’s strategy of relying on government intervention to block private
development highlights the ambiguous role of the Puerto Rican government in
potentially constraining market forces. The Puerto Rican government has not taken
a position in support of or in opposition to large-scale development in Vieques.
In fact, it was the Puerto Rican government that allowed the construction of the
Martineau Bay on public land on Vieques’ north coast. With its high walls and highpriced rooms, Wyndam Martineau Bay is an emblem of the kind of development
that could disenfranchise the local population. The Puerto Rican government acted
to facilitate this process.
Yet on the other side of the island, Puerto Rican government policy appears to
clash with the Sunbay Consortium’s vision of building an 80-acre mega complex
that would attract international tourists. The Puerto Rican government is
promoting two small-scale projects: cabins in Sun Bay Beach Park, catering to
the Puerto Rican middle and working class families on weekend trips to Vieques,
and a fish house in Esperanza that would benefit local fishers. The Sunbay
Consortium and its proponents have fiercely opposed the cabins, arguing that
they might become “havens for noisy parties and drug dealing.” The fishermen’s
wharf, they argue, would bring “stench and pollution” that would blight
Esperanza.19 In different ways these government projects challenge the exclusivity
envisioned by the resort planners. The Sun Bay cabins project an entirely different
view of leisure and recreation from the golf-spa-polo club model promoted by the
consortium. The fish house directly challenges resort plans for beachfront
development. To build the fish house, the Puerto Rican government would
expropriate land currently owned by the consortium that is essential for beach
access for the mega resort. Without beach access, the resort is seriously
compromised. The Puerto Rican government plan, therefore, may ultimately
check the power of global capital.
Residents in Tortuguero repeatedly stressed their desire for access to the land
and for small-scale development that would bring work and allow residents to stay
in Vieques. While there did not exist strong class consciousness opposed to market
forces or capitalist development in principle, there was a strong sense of
connection and right to the land. This “agregado” consciousness, this strong
sense of local, rural identity, has long acted as the fuel sustaining social protest
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N OT E S
1

A recent study contracted by the Puerto Rican Health Department documents
significant uranium contamination in sea grass beds from the eastern firing range all the
way along the south coast of the island, including the public beach of Esperanza (Vieques
Times, Summer 2004). This study points to the complexity of the clean-up process, and
the way contamination on the former base has spread into the civilian sector.
2
A recent article analyzed housing sales in the Esperanza neighborhood of Vieques.
The article detailed frenzied buying in an 18-month period between 2003 and the first 6
months of 2004. Thirty-six properties were sold during this period, twenty-two to buyers
from the U.S., eight to buyers from the Puerto Rican mainland and only two to buyers
from Vieques (other buyers could not be classified). During this same 18-month period,
housing prices in the neighborhood rose by 50 percent (Claridad, July 8–14, 2004).
3
Perhaps the most striking indicator of the rapid gentrification of the island was an ad
in the New York Times “Escape” section, offering a three-bedroom house with guesthouse
for sale in Vieques for $2.5 million. The owner was quoted as saying: “We love the beach,
we love the Caribbean. Vieques, though, is very different from many of the other islands.
Two-thirds of the island is a wild preserve, and there are a lot of beautiful beaches with
no development—that’s what is special to us” (New York Times, 5/20/05).
4
Data in this section are drawn from McCaffrey (2002) and are the product of
ethnographic, documentary, and archival research.
5
St. Thomas, for example, which is 32 square miles, is roughly half the area of 51square-mile Vieques, yet boasts a population of 51,000, more than five times that of
Vieques’s population of just under 10,000.
6
Bergad describes agregados as “service tenants who exchanged usufruct rights to small
parcels of land for various labor obligations” (1983: 88). Agregados have traditionally been
regarded as the most exploited sector of the Puerto Rican working class, because they had
no formal rights to the land and lived at the whim of the landowner. But Bergad argues that
among the landless laborers, the use rights agregados staked to the land were central to
their survival and autonomy. Giusti (1996) argues that these peasant-like subsistence
activities were central to both workers’ survival and the social autonomy of laborers.
7
In the 1930s, 95 percent of the rural population, or two-thirds of Vieques’ total
population of 10,582, was landless, while two sugar corporations consumed 71 percent of
island land. Only two other Puerto Rican municipalities, Santa Isabel, dominated by the
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fishermen’s perspective, bombing was problematic because it created economic hardship:
fish were smaller in size, and fishermen had to spend more time and resources traveling
further out to sea to net a decent catch.
18
In August 2005, shortly before this article went to press, the Casa del Francés was burned to
the ground by arsonists. Struggle over the landmark structure had intensified in the months prior
to the crime. Activists successfully lobbied the municipal assembly to approve a resolution in
favor of expropriating the Casa. Supporters and opponents of the resort had increasingly hinged
the future of the resort on the status of the Casa—as a reception hall for wealthy tourists, or a
heritage site for locally based tourism. Burning the plantation house to the ground apparently
removed any encumbrances the landmarked monument might have presented to unfettered
development of the resort. At this writing, the case remains under criminal investigation.
19 New York Times, July 26, 2003.
20 The Sunbay Resort Development project description (January 1999) describes the
complex as “a first class resort on the Southern shore of Vieques … a quasi-deserted
Caribbean island …. The Sun Bay Resort will include both real estate and hotel development
ventures … acquiring approximately 500 acres of land bordering a spectacular natural
reserve near the village of Esperanza; building and marketing a wide spectrum of residential
condos, from artist studios to ranch houses … a 200-room, beach front hotel; a 75-cabin,
ecological village; a 45-room hilltop inn; and a 40-room golf club hotel … several restaurants,
bars and clubs, an 18 hole golf course, marina facilities, river pools, health and beauty spas,
sailing, scuba and equestrian schools, a botanical garden, riding paths and polo fields” (cited
by the Committee to Rescue and Develop Vieques, “No to the Speculators,” 8/30/03).
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